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Gender Differences in the Information Systems Managerial Ranks: 
An Assessment of Discriminatory practices 
Abstract 
This paper examines the extent to which gender discrimination 
is a force effecting the senior managerial ranks of the information 
systems (IS) occupation. While the employment trends of women in 
the IS occupation is encouraging, we present data which suggests 
that IS is not immune to the problems of gender discrimination. 
~nalyzing data gathered by the Society for Information Management 
(SIM), we find several serious problems suggestive of 
discriminatory practices. First, a disproportionate majority of 
senior IS management is male. Second, women receive lower salaries 
than men even when controlling for age, education, job level and 
tenure within the organization. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
On July 2, 1965 the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became effective. 
This legislative action permeated many areas of American society; 
one portion of i t - T i t  1 1  addressed economic or employment 
opportunity. Congress included Title VII with the intent of 
ushering in an era of equitable practice in American businesses, 
and to provide employment opportunities for peoples of all races, 
colors, religions, national origins and genders. Since the 
institution of the Civil Rights Act, and the professed conformance 
of many business organizations to it through attachment to the 
I1Equal Opportunity Employerqq designation, much research has been 
conducted to assess changing employment patterns in the United 
States. The objective of this research has been to cultivate an 
understanding of the nature and degree of these changes, whether 
they are influenced directly by the Civil Rights Act, indirectly 
through changing societal attitudes, or in spite of these 
legislative progressions and societal changes. 
This paper continues this research genre, by focusing on the 
managerial levels1 of the Information Systems (IS) occupation. 
The scope of our investigation addresses one dimension in which 
unequal employment opportunity i.e. discrimination, has been, and 
perhaps still is, occurring--gender. 
'we focus on the managerial ranks as we believe this will be the group most 
impacted by discriminatory practices. 
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1.1 Evidence of Discrimination in the IS Field 
The prevailing consensus has cast the IS occupation as 
relatively immune fromthe serious discrimination patterns found in 
most other occupations, particularly when contrasted to those 
patterns found in typically male-dominated occupations such as 
manufacturing [Simons, 19811. Encouraging this "consensus", one 
argument suggests the IS occupation is devoid of discriminatory 
practices because it emerged after discriminatory practices and 
sexist attitudes subsided in Western culture [Simons, 19811. 
Unfortunately, empirical evidence may suggest the "prevailing 
consensusw is wrong. For example, though the recent trend in IS 
employment figures is encouraging (see Table 0) and mirrors 
patterns occurring in non-IS occupations [Forgionne and Peeters 
1982, Veiga 1977, Vaydanoff 19801, in contrasting IS to other 
business occupations, as of 1988 women accounted for 49.6% of 
accountants/auditors, 49.1% of personnel/labor relations managers 
and 42.4% of financial managers, while only 29.5% of computer 
systems analysts and 32.2% of computer programmers were women 
[statistical Abstract of the United States 19901. 
................................ 
* Insert Table 0 About Here * 
1.2 The Nature of Discrimination 
The potential for gender discrimination can be classified into 
two practices: access and treatment discrimination [Levitin et al, 
19711. Access discrimination places non-job-related qualifications 
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on individuals, such as gender, race, age, and physical appearance 
among others, which limit or bar their recruitment. Treatment 
discrimination is manifested in salary, job level and status symbol 
discrepancies. Treatment discrimination creates divergence in job 
outcomes between two groups comparable in work experience, 
education and skills after access occurs. 
Table 0 ostensibly indicates discriminatory practices, however 
further examination may dispel this conclusion. Frenkel ( 1990 )  
reported that in 1988 32.5% and 26.9% of computer science 
bachelor's and master's degrees respectively were awarded to women. 
These figures roughly match the 1988 employment statistics for 
women programmers and systems analysts. Therefore, if we assume 
that the hiring for computer programmers and analysts is done 
largely from colleges and universities, then the pool of new 
employees selected for access into =-supervisory positions 
corresponds approximately to the pool of applicants. This data 
would suggest access discrimination is occurring earlier: either 
during the socialization process when womens1 attitudes about 
appropriate jobs roles are formed, during the college admissions 
process, or during the educational process [Frenkel, 19901 .  
While the data presented above suggests no access 
discrimination at the entry-level, it provides no information 
regarding access and treatment discrimination at the supervisory 
and managerial levels where the organizational literature suggests 
the greater problems exist [Steinberg and Shapiro, 19821 .  This 
paper will focus, therefore, on discriminatory practices as they 
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affect the IS managerial ranks. The following section reviews the 
organizational literature on gender discrimination. 
2 .  THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION 
The literature covering gender issues in organizational 
contexts employs one of three theories. The three theories 
typically exercised are stereotv~ins theorv [Stewart and Gudykunst 
1982, Schein 1973, Rosen and Jerdee 1973, Golembiewski 1977, 
steinberg and Shapiro 1982, Bart01 and Wortman 1976, Schuler 1975, 
Rosen and Jerdee 19741, attribution theorv [Deaux 1979, Deaux and 
Farris 1977, Deaux and Emswiller 1974, Taynor and Deaux 19731, and 
eauitv theorv [Levanthal and Michaels 1971, 1969, Taynor and Deaux 
19731. Terborg and Ilgen (1975) provide an extensive review of 
studies applying these theoretical approaches to explain various 
manifestations of gender differences. Brief descriptions of these 
theories follow. 
2.1 stereotyping 
Stereotyping theory suggests advancement of women into 
managerial positions is disrupted by perceived discrepancies 
between female characteristics i.e. feminine characteristics, and 
those characteristics believed important for managerial success 
i.e. masculine characteristics [Terborg and Ilgen 19751. Feminine 
characteristics include empathetic, intuitive [Schuler 19751, 
sympathetic, compassionate, non-aggressive [Rosen and Jerdee 19731, 
emotional [Steinberg and Shapiro 19821, dependent [Rosen and Jerdee 
1973, Steinberg and Shapiro 19821, and an affiliation-orientation 
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[Schuler 1975, Rosen and Jerdee 1973, Steinberg and Shapiro 19821. 
Masculine characteristics include competitive, objective, 
aggressive, ambitious [Stewart and Gudykunst 19821, powerful, 
initiatory [Rosen and Jerdee 19731, rational, efficient, tough- 
minded, stable [Steinberg and Shapiro 19821, and capable of 
leadership [Stewart and Gudykunst 1982, Steinberg and Shapiro 
19821. It is the rigid application of feminine characteristics to 
women, and masculine characteristics to men and "the successful 
managern, that engenders discrimination through stereotyping. As 
long as individuals maintain these stereotypic attitudes, such as 
believing women possess less desirable characteristics for 
managerial positions as cited by Deaux (1979) or beholding 
management as a "masculine-ethict1 [Steinberg and Shapiro 19821, the 
ability of women to permeate managerial ranks will be limited. 
2.2 Attribution 
Attribution theory suggests factors related to work success or 
failure can be attributed to personal factors, classified either as 
fixed (e.g. intelligence, ability, skill set) or variable (e.g. 
task difficulty, luck) [Terborg and Ilgen 19751. When an 
individual performs as expected, the result is attributed to fixed 
factors; when an individual performs below or above expectations, 
the result is attributed to variable factors. Based on the 
prevailing expectations about womenls managerial capability, a 
female manager's above average performance will be attributed to 
variable factors e.g. luck, while a male manager's performance will 
be attributed to fixed factors e.g. ability [Deaux and Emswiller, 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-92-05 
19741. 
2.3 Equity 
Equity theory proposes individuals assess their inputs (e.9. 
education, tenure, age) and outcomes (e.g. pay, job level, 
promotions), subjectively appraise a ratio of outcomes to inputs, 
contrast their ratio to a "comparison person's" ratio, and 
proceedingly base their job satisfaction on perceived equity or 
inequity between theirs and the comparison person's ratios [Terborg 
and Ilgen 19751. Equity will induce a state of satisfaction; 
inequity will induce dissatisfaction motivating individuals to 
remove the inequity. In the context of measuring gender 
differences in managerial ranks, equity theory may suggest 
advantages, as well as disadvantages, for women. For example 
Taynor and Deaux (1973) found women were compensated with greater 
rewards for equal performance, because those with an unfavorable 
predisposition towards women perceived them as exerting more effort 
to compensate for fewer qualifications (inputs) at the onset. 
~lternatively, equity theory may predict serious disadvantages for 
women, especially in scientific and management positions [Terborg 
and Ilgen 19751. As outcomes will be distributed according to 
inputs in a manner consistent with equity maintenance, a male 
manager with traditional attitudes towards women will perceive they 
possess fewer inputs, and thereby allocate fewer outcomes to the 
female. Considering males dominate managerial positions in most 
occupations, one might use equity theory to explain the discrepant 
salary levels between genders across a wide array of occupational 
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groups [Time of Change 19831. 
2.4 Purpose of the  Study 
The focus in this paper is to empirically assess the extent of 
access and treatment discrimination in IS su~ervision, which is a 
necessary precursor to alleviating it should it in fact exist. The 
census information provides no data by gender across hierarchical 
levels for the IS occupation and almost no empirical studies exist 
addressing discrimination within the IS managerial ranks. One 
exception is a survey conducted by Dubnoff and Kraft (1986) which 
found that women are overrepresented in lower paid IS-related 
specializations and underrepresented in higher paid IS-related 
specializations, including management roles. In this paper, we 
will appraise the extent of the disparity between men and women by 
assessing IS managerial employment numbers, IS managerial salary 
levels, job levels and promotional opportunities differentiated by 
gender. Concomitantly we intend to assess any gender difference in 
job and career satisfaction. In this paper, while we will be able 
to show differences between men and women we cannot state 
conclusively that these differences are a result of discrimination. 
It is important to note that we are not testing equity or 
stereotyping theory, but rather are using these theories to help 
frame our hypotheses. 
3 HYPOTHESES 
To determine the extent of access discrimination in the IS 
managerial ranks we compare the number of IS male and female 
managers by drawing on stereotyping for theoretical support 
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(Hypothesis 1) . To evaluate treatment discrimination, we 
investigate differences in salary, job levels and promotional 
opportunities between genders. As these are considered outcomes 
within the equity theory framework [Adams 19651, equity and 
stereotyping are used as theoretical support (Hypotheses 2-4). 
Finally, career and job satisfaction differences between male and 
female IS managers are investigated as well (Hypotheses 5a, 5b). 
3.1 ~ypothesis 1 
H.1. A disproportionate2 majority of IS managers is male. 
The literature regarding sex-role stereotypes and their 
influence on access discrimination is well summarized by Terborg 
and Ilgen (1975, p. 354) and provides support for this hypothesis. 
As they state, I f . .  .there seems to exist a stereotype of specific 
traits which are believed to be essential for administrative 
(supervisory/managerial) success, and women are seen as not 
possessing these traits." Since women are perceived to possess 
predominately feminine traits and the role of supervision or 
management is perceived to require masculine traits, we predict 
that fewer women will occupy supervisory or management positions 
because of this perceived incompatibility. 
Our hypothesis is also based in part on empirical evidence as 
well. Women have not advanced into senior management positions 
despite increasing representation in the labor force, as indicated 
2 ~ t  is difficult to define what is meant by disproportionate here. Clearly 
we do not expect a 50% split. It is left up to the reader to determine whether 
we have demonstrated a disproportionate number of IS managers are male or not. 
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in Steinberg and Shapirols (1982) review. This phenomenon is 
illustrated in several studies with unequal sample sizes between 
genders, where the sample was selected at random and from a pool of 
supervisors or managers3. Specific sample distributions by gender 
(malelfemale) include 82.5/17.2% (n=99) [Forgionne and Peeters 
19821, 85.0/15.0% (n=98) [Rosen and Jerdee 19731, 76.6/23.4% 
(n=1035) [Mobley 19821, 73.6/26.4% (n=72) [Bartol and Wortman 
19761, and 63.3/36.7% (n=49) [Kavanagh and Halpern 19771. 
Furthermore, regarding their sample distribution Bartol and Wortman 
(1976, p. 178) state, ". . .this imbalance in the number of male and 
female supervisors reflects the reality in this and many 
organizations1'. The disproportionate numbers are reflected in the 
census-based data as well. A study by the U.S. Department of Labor 
[Time of Chancre, 19831 shows that women account for only 27.5% of 
all non-farm managers and administrators. 
3.2 Hypothesis 2 
H.2. Women receive lower salaries than men, even when controlling 
for age, education, job level and tenure within the 
organization. 
Stereotyping and equity theory jointly provide theoretical 
support for this hypothesis. Because females are viewed as lacking 
the necessary characteristics for effectively executing supervisory 
or managerial roles (stereotyping theory), they will be perceived 
Where sample statistics indicate gender equity, it is generally the result 
of deliberate research design i.e. matched subjects [Deaux 1979, Saleh and 
Lalljee 1969, Wexley and Pulakos 19821, or a female-dominated industry [Brief and 
Oliver 19761 rather than an indication of reduced access discrimination. 
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as providing fewer inputs and consequently will be awarded lower 
salaries (equity theory). This hypothesis is also based on 
empirical evidence. Empirical data from the Department of Labor 
[Time of Chanse, 19831 indicate women consistently earn lower wages 
across all occupational groups, managerial and supervisory 
included. However, salary has been anticipated or found to covary 
with job level [Ebeling et a1 1979, Weaver 1978, Weaver 1977, Hulin 
and Smith 19651, age [Ebeling et a1 1979, Forgionne and Peeters 
1978, Weaver 1978, Hulin and Smith 19651, education [Forgionne and 
Peeters 1978, Weaver 19781, and tenure within the organization 
[Hulin and Smith 19651, which the Department of Labor study did not 
consider. These variables will be controlled in this study. 
H.3. Women occupy lower job levels than men, even when controlling 
for age, education, salary and tenure within the organization. 
Similar to Hypothesis 2, stereotyping and equity theory 
jointly provide theoretical support for this hypothesis. Because 
females are viewed as lacking the necessary characteristics for 
effectively executing supervisory or managerial roles (stereotyping 
theory), they will be perceived as providing fewer inputs and 
consequently will occupy lower job levels (equity theory). This 
hypothesis is consistent with Stewart and Gudykunst's (1982) 
finding of a significant difference between genders in job level. 
They controlled for several covariates, including age [Stewart and 
Gudykunst 1982, Ebeling et a1 1979, Schuler 1975, Saleh and Lalljee 
1969, Hulin and Smith 19651, education [Stewart and Gudykunst 1982, 
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Schuler 1975, Saleh and Lalljee 19691, tenure within the 
organization [Stewart and Gudykunst 1982, Hulin and Smith 19651, 
and salary [Stewart and Gudykunst 1982, Weaver 1977, Hulin and 
Smith 19651. These covariates will be controlled in this study as 
well. 
3.4 Hypothesis 4 
H. 4. There is no difference between women and men in terms of their 
satisfaction with promotional opportunities, when controlling 
for age, education, job level and tenure within the 
organizatiop. 
The empirical studies investigating gender differences in 
promotional opportunities overwhelming find none [Wheeler 1981, 
Bart01 and Wortmen 1976, and Schuler 19751, although some counter 
evidence exists [Deaux 19791. We hypothesize, consistent with the 
majority of studies, that while controlling for age, education 
[Stewart and Gudykunst 1982, Schuler 19751, tenure within the 
organization [Stewart and Gudykunst 19821, and job level [Schuler 
19751, there will be no difference in satisfaction with promotional 
opportunities. 
3.5 Hypothesis 5 
H.5. There is no difference in overall job (5a) and career (5b) 
satisfaction between genders, when controlling for age, 
education, job level, salary and tenure within the 
organization. 
The majority of empirical studies investigating gender 
differences in job satisfaction indicate no significant differences 
when controlling, either statistically or through research design, 
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for the moderating effects of age, salary, education, job level and 
tenure within the organization [Weaver 1978, Forgionne and Peeters 
1982,  bel ling et a1 1979, Weaver 1977, Deaux 1979, Voydanoff 1980, 
Saleh and Lalljee 1969, Bartol and Wortman 1976, Golembiewski 
19771. Where differences are found, no control over these 
moderating effects is exerted (Shapiro and Stern 1975, Ebeling et 
a1 1979, Weaver 19771. Interestingly, those moderating influences 
which appear to determine job satisfaction independent of other 
covariates include age and job level. Weaver (1978) found age has 
a significant linear effect on job satisfaction; Ebeling et a1 
(1979) and Kavanagh and Halpern (1977) found job level has a 
significant curvilinear and linear effect on job satisfaction 
respectively. 
4 .  METHOD 
4.1 Sample 
We focused on senior level IS management because we believe 
the ability to detect discriminatory practices will be greatest 
here. This belief is based on Scheinfs (1974) framework which 
conceives of an individualfs career progression being filtered 
through organizational mechanisms, which inhibit or promote career 
advancement either vertically, horizontally or radially to 
subsequent stages. Bartol (1978) asserts discriminatory practices 
will be manifested during hierarchical career movement 
(transition), which will inhibit advancement to the next stage. 
As several upward career transitions are necessary to reach high- 
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level management, it is this select group that will have 
experienced most career transitions and hence will have had the 
greatest exposure to potential discriminatory practices. Assuming 
high-level IS managers have experienced the most transitions, we 
believe the effect, and thus the effect size, from discriminatory 
practices would be most pronounced with these senior-level 
subjects . 
Our sample consists of 491 subjects. The data were collected 
through a 1989 mail survey conducted by the Society of Information 
Management (SIM) of their membership. 570 questionnaires were 
returned representing a 32 percent response rate. The sample 
represents IS executives occupying positions from CEO to manager. 
The distribution of subjects by industry, company annual revenues, 
and number of IS employees is given in Table 1. Overall frequency 
distributions are listed with breakdowns by gender for each 
variable. To determine if there were any systematic differences or 
biases in the types of organizations employing men versus women, we 
tested for differences in industry type, revenues, and organization 
size by gender. No significant differences were detected even when 
applying a liberal significance level of .lo. 
........................................ 
* * 
* Insert Table 1 About Here * 
* * 
........................................ 
The difference of 79 subjects represents the removal of academics and 
those who did not indicate gender in their survey. 
13 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-92-05 
4.2 Measures 
The variables used for analyses are presented in Table 2 with 
frequency distributions and medians or means where appropriate. 
The variables are measured using scales developed in conjunction 
with SIM. The ordinal variables include age (AGE), annual salary 
(SALARY), tenure within the organization (ORGYEARS), reporting 
levels to CEO (RPTLEVEL), job satisfaction (JOBSAT), career 
satisfaction (CARSAT) and likelihood of career goal achievement 
(PROMO) 5 .  (Note that RPTLEVEL, JOBSAT and CARSAT utilize reversed 
scales.) Level of education (EDUC) and gender (GENDER) are 
measured using nominal scales. These variables1 scales are shown 
in Appendix A. 
........................................ 
* * 
* Insert Table 2 About Here ~r 
* * 
........................................ 
With the exception of the job satisfaction, career 
satisfaction, and satisfaction with promotional opportunities 
measures, all questionnaire items were standard demographic 
information which SIM had been collecting from its members for 
several years. In all cases these items simply asked the respondent 
to check off to which category they belong (e.g. Ifplease indicate 
your salary range and/or annual cash compensation. l1 flHow many 
years have you been with the organization?") The entire 
We interpret this variable as an indication of perceived promotional 
opportunity. 
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questionnaire was pretested by five SIM members to make certain 
that all the items (as well as the three new psychometric scales) 
were clear and meaningful to the population surveyed. No problems 
were detected during the pre-test and, given the careful 
development and review of the survey, we believe this provides 
substantial evidence of the instrument's face validity [Stone 
19781. 
The job satisfaction, career satisfaction, and promotional 
opportunity scales asked the respondents for an overall assessment 
of their job, career and promotional opportunity satisfaction. Such 
overall assessments have been shown to be robust measures and are 
recommended by Scarpello and Campbell [1983]. The job satisfaction 
and career satisfaction measures have also been used and tested 
previously, [Baroudi 19881, and found to exhibit acceptable 
psychometric characteristics. 
Although we have no reliability data for the career 
satisfaction, job satisfaction and promotional opportunity 
measures6, it was possible to provide some evidence for the 
validity of our psychometric scales by testing the extent to which 
they converge or diverge as expected. For example, it was expected 
that job satisfaction, career satisfaction and satisfaction with 
promotional opportunities would all be highly and significantly 
correlated. As can be seen in table 3a7, we in fact found this to 
We were not permitted to add duplicate or multiple items to provide a test 
for reliability due to SIM's concern for the length of the questionnaire. 
Zero-order correlations with significance levels among the variables are 
presented in Table 3a (all subjects) and Table 3b (males and females). 
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be true. This provides some evidence for the convergent validity of 
the measures. While we cannot make a final claim for the validity 
of these measures, we believe they are acceptable for use in this 
first study of gender discrimination in IS. 
........................................ 
* * 
* Insert Tables 3a and 3b About Here * 
* * 
........................................ 
4 . 3  Analysis 
Hypothesis 1 was tested using frequency distributions. 
Hypotheses 2 through 5 were analyzed using multiple regression8, 
because it allows for control of those variables hypothesized to 
covary with the respective dependent variables. The power of the 
regression analyses assuming medium effect size and an alpha error 
level of 5% is over 99.5%, primarily due to the very large sample 
size [Cohen 19871. Variables EDUC and GENDER utilizing nominal 
scales were dummy coded, consequently n-1 dummy variables were 
created and entered into the regression where n is the number of 
scale categories. In all instances, GENDER was entered last to 
assess its effects on the respective dependent variables separate 
from the effects of the covariates. 
The scales of some variables (AGE, SALARY, ORGYEARS and RPTLEVEL) were 
nominalized. Cohen and Cohen (1983, p.253) have shown that the regression model 
remains robust if the scale intervals are approximately equal. 
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5 .  RESULTS 
The results of our analyses follow and are summarized in Table 
4. With the exception of Hypothesis 3, all hypotheses were 
confirmed. 
H . 1 .  A disproportionate majority of IS managers is male. 
As indicated in Table 1, there is a disproportionate number of 
males (441) compared to females (50) within our sample. With an n 
of 491, the results indicate in our sample that 90% of IS 
management positions are occupied by men. Clearly, women are either 
not surviving or not being promoted to the senior IS ranks as 
rapidly as their male peers. Consequently, hypothesis 1 is 
supported; the data is suggestive that some evidence of 
discrimination in the IS managerial ranks is present at least for 
this sample. 
H.2. Women receive lower salaries than men, even when controlling 
for age, education, job level and tenure within the 
organization. 
The regression analysis showed that gender was significant in 
explaining variance in salary, even after job level, age, education 
and tenure within the organization are controlled for. At p<.01, 
gender accounted for 1.7% of the salary variance. 
Though an R~ of 1.7% may appear trivial, consideration of the 
B scoreg and the SALARY scale lends more relevance to the result. 
The beta is generally not useful for dummy coded variables. (See Cohen 
and Cohen (1983) p.194.) 
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The B score for GENDER is .82. Because males were dummy coded as 
'1' and females as 0 the .82 is interpreted as the average 
increase in dependent variable raw score units when comparing males 
to females [Cohen and Cohen 19831. SALARY'S raw score is measured 
on an ordinal scale; it has ten intervals. Therefore the .82 is 
interpreted as males on average being 82% higher across scale 
intervals. We have used the mode of the intervals' range, which is 
25,000, as representative of all interval ranges1'. 82% of 25,000 
is 20,500 which indicates that men on average have roughly a 20,500 
dollar higher annual salary than do women of comparable job level, 
age, education and tenure within the organization. This is not a 
trivial amount. Consequently, hypothesis 2 is supported; evidence 
suggestive of treatment discrimination regarding pay is present. 
H.3. Women occupy lower job levels than men, even when controlling 
for age, education, salary and tenure within the organization. 
The results did not support the hypothesis. Job level was not 
significantly different between genders after controlling for age, 
education, tenure within the organization and salary; only tenure 
within the organization accounted for a significant portion of the 
job level variance at 1.8%. 
H.4. There is no difference between women and men in terms of their 
satisfaction with promotional opportunities, when controlling 
for age, education, job level and tenure within the 
organization. 
C a l c u l a t i o n  of  t h e  averaqe s c a l e  i n t e r v a l  range  i s  p r e f e r r e d .  However, 
t h e  range  f o r  t h e  l a s t  i n t e r v a l  ' >  250,000' i s  i n f i n i t e  which makes c a l c u l a t i o n  
of a t r u e  s c a l e  i n t e r v a l  range mean d i f f i c u l t .  (See Appendix A ) .  
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The hypothesis is supported. There is no significant 
difference between genders regarding perceived promotional 
opportunities. All covariates were found to account for a 
significant amount of promotional opportunity variance. 
H . 5 .  There is no difference in overall job (5a) and career (5b) 
satisfaction between genders, when controlling for age, 
education, job level, salary and tenure within the 
organization. 
The hypothesis is confirmed. Both job and career satisfaction 
were found not to differ significantly between genders, as 
evidenced by the F ratio significance scores of .90 and .35 
respectively. Only salary (SALARY) and job level (RPTLEVEL) 
accounted for a significant portion of job and career satisfaction. 
6. DISCUSSION 
In this section we will first discuss those findings which 
were not supported and attempt to provide potential explanations 
for why. Next, we will discuss the findings for which there was 
support and explore what this may mean. As noted in section 2.4 we 
are not testing equity or stereotyping theory but have used these 
theories to develop our hypotheses. The results, we believe, 
demonstrate that both equity and stereotyping theories are useful 
avenues for exploring the complex question of gender and 
discrimination. 
6.1 Unsupported Findings 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported using RPTLEVEL as the 
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independent variable, which measures hierarchical level by 
capturing the number of reporting levels between subjects and 
respective CEOs. After obtaining insignificant results, we decided 
to further test this hypothesis using a similar variable--job title 
(JOBTITLE). The variable employs an ordinal scale and represents 
the subjects1 job title; it correlates with RPTLEVEL at r=.20, 
p<.Ol. (See Appendix A for a description of the scale.) We 
considered using this variable initially, but were uncomfortable 
with its use as job titles can invoke different meanings for 
people. The results showed GENDER still remained insignificant in 
explaining job level variance as measured via job title providing 
additional evidence that H3 is not valid. 
Two plausible explanations could account for this. First, it 
could be an artifact of the sample such as the SIM database not 
being representative of the general population of IS managers. 
Since association with SIM is voluntary, nonrepresentativeness is 
a possibility. Second, organizations may be using hierarchical 
level as a method of tokenism; that is, granting advances in the 
organizational hierarchy without corresponding increases in salary 
in order to mitigate employee dissatisfaction. Analysis of salary 
levels between genders for each hierarchical level revealed that 
womens' salaries are approximately one level below that of men1'. 
For one h ie ra rch ica l  l e v e l  women earned s l i g h t l y  more, however only  two 
women, compared t o  81 men, f e l l  i n t o  t h i s  category. 
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6.2 Supported Findings 
The results of hypothesis 2 revealed that women earn 
significantly less salary, though the results of hypothesis 5 
showed no significant difference in job and career satisfaction. 
This is intriguing since equity theory would predict that earning 
less salary for comparable responsibilities (results of hypothesis 
3 showed no difference in job level) would lead to less 
satisfaction. However these combined results are congruent with a 
pattern identified by Campbell et a1 (1976). In their study, even 
though women were found to earn lower salaries this did not appear 
to decrease their job and career satisfaction. They explainedthis 
discrepancy in terms of women's judgements regarding the objective 
conditions such as salary levels, and subjective evaluations of 
work such as job satisfaction. Essentially they state that women 
may be unaware of any incomparable treatment. Given salary levels 
are not generally discussed among employees, women may be unaware 
of the salary discrepancy revealed in our analysis. 
7. conclusion 
This study has found evidence of two types of potential 
discriminatory practices: the underrepresentation of women in the 
senior ranks of IS management, and significant salary differences 
between female and male IS managers. We cannot conclude from this 
study however, that the problem of female underrepresentation is 
the result of overt access discriminatory practices. It is quite 
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possible that women opt out of the profession as they reach a 
certain age to assume primary family care responsibilities. We do 
believe however, that organizations have not been sensitive to the 
family care needs of either their female or male employees. Most 
organizational personnel practices were developed and 
institutionalized in a period when one member of the family worked 
outside the home and the other assumed primary family care 
responsibility [Johnston and Packard, 19871. With the increasing 
need for both parents to remain gainfully employed, and with the 
growth in single parent families, such practices and policies do 
not effectively accommodate the personnel realities of today. 
Organizations have no choice but to develop new and informed 
practices which will permit both work and family to productively 
coexist. 
The discrepancy in salary between the male and female IS 
managers, however, is strong evidence of overt treatment 
discriminatory practices by organizations. Such discrimination 
dispels the myth of IS as an occupation free from such unacceptable 
practices. Beyond the important issue of social justice and the 
legal liabilities which such practices create, gender 
discrimination has other potentially adverse consequences for the 
employing organization. Gender discrimination means that we are 
permitting non-job-related and non-performance related factors to 
determine who is promoted and rewarded. We, therefore, may not be 
promoting the best qualified or most highly skilled workers -- to 
the detriment of the organization. 
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The maintenance of such discriminatory practices will become 
even more onerous once we examine the shifting demographics which 
are sweeping this country. While men accounted for 57% of the 1985 
workforce, the labor market is becoming increasingly feminized 
[Johnston and Packer, 19871. Between 1985 and the year 2000, women 
will account for 64% of the workers entering the job market 
[Johnston and Packard, 19871. Organizations that wish to sustain 
gender discriminatory policies will find a shrinking labor pool 
from which to recruit. We do not believe that gender discriminatory 
practices can be maintained in such an environment; consequently, 
organizations need to carefully examine and review their hiring, 
promotion, salary, and personnel practices. While examining gender 
discrimination is difficult and often emotionally charged, such 
examination is critical to the health and success of both the IS 
occupation and our increasingly technologically-dependent society. 
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Appendix A 
INDUSTRY/VERTICAL MARKET 
'MANUFACTURING' 
'COMPUTER HW/SW MANUFACTURING' 
' FINANCE ' 
' INSURANCE ' 
'GOVERNMENT' 
'EDUCATION' 
'TRANSPORTATION' 
'NATURAL RESOURCES/ENERGY1 
'CONSULTING' 
' UTILITY ' 
'CONSTRUCTION, MINING' 
'SERVICE ORGANIZATION' 
'RETAILIWHOLESALE TRADE' 
'PRINTING/PUBLISHING1 
'COMMUNICATIONS' 
' OTHER ' 
COMPANY SIZE IN ANNUAL REVENUES 
0 -  ' N/A1 
1 -  ' < 50 MILLION' 
2 - ' 50 - 99MILLION1 
3 - '100 - 249 MILLION' 
4 - '250 - 499 MILLION' 
5 - '500 - 999 MILLION' 
6 -  ' 1 -  3 BILLION' 
7 - ' 3 - 4.9 BILLION' 
8 - ' 5 - 9.9 BILLION' 
9 - ' 10 - 14.9 BILLION' 
10 - ' 15 - 19 BILLION' 
11 - ' > 20 BILLION' 
IS DEPARTMENT SIZE IN NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 
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ANNUAL SALARY ( SALARY ) 
TENURE WITHIN THE ORGANIZATION (ORGYEARS) 
1 -  ' < 1 YEAR' 
2 -  '1 - 3YEARS1 
3 - '4 - 7 YEARS' 
4 -  '8 -12YEARS1 
5 - '13 - 20 YEARS' 
6 -  ' >20YEARS1 
EDUCATION (EDUC) 
0 - 'NO EDUCATION' 
1 - 'BACHELOR DEGREE' 
2 - 'MASTER DEGREE' 
3 - 'PHD DEGREE' / 
AGE (AGE) 
1 -  ' - 30' 
2 -  '30-34' 
3 - '35-39j 
4 - '40-44' 
5 -  '45-49' 
6 -  '50-54' 
7 -  '55-59' 
8 -  ' > 60' 
JOB LEVEL (RPTLEVEL) 
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CAREER SATISFACTION (CARSAT) 
1 - 'VERY SATISFIED' 
2 
3 
4 
5 - 'VERY DISSATISFIED' 
JOB SATISFACTION (JOBSAT) 
1 - 'VERY SATISFIED' 
2 
3 
4 
5 - 'VERY DISSATISFIED' 
LIKELIHOOD OF CAREER GOAL ATTAINMENT (PROMO) 
1 - 'NOT AT ALL LIKELY' 
2 
3 
4 
5 - 'VERY LIKELY' 
JOB TITLE (JOBTITLE) 
1 - 'CEO/CHAIRMAN/PRESIDENT1 
2 - 'PRINCIPAL/PARTNER1 
3 - 'CIO' 
4 - 'CORPORATE/EXECUTIVE SENIOR/VP1 
5 - 'ASSISTANT VP' 
6 - 'DIRECTOR' 
7 - 'ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR' 
8 - 'MANAGER' 
9 - 'PROFESSOR' 
10 - 'OTHER' 
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TABLE 0 - PERCENT FEMALE IN JOB CATEGORY 1 
1988' I 29.5% 1 32.2% 
a - Weber and Gilchrist (1975) 
b - Orlikowski and Baroudi (1989) 
c - Statistical Abstract of the United States - 1990 (1990) 
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100 - 249 MILLION 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-92-05 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-92-05 
TABLE 1 - 
MEDIAN SCORE 
NUMBER OF IS EMPLOYEES 
< 50 
5 0 - 1 9 9  
200 - 399 
400 - 999 
1,000 - 1,999 
> 2,000 
N / A  
MEDIAN SCORE 
FREOUENCY 
ALL 
(n=491) 
1-3 
BILLION 
ALL 
93 (19%) 
126 (26%) 
65 (13%) 
73 (15%) 
32 ( 7%) 
48 (10%) 
54 (11%) 
50 - 199 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
MALE 
(n=441) 
1-3 
BILLION 
MALE 
83 (19%) 
118 (27%) 
60 (14%) 
64 (15%) 
29 ( 7%) 
42 (10%) 
45 (10%) 
50 - 199 
FEMALE 
(n=50) 
1-3 
BILLION 
FEMALE 
10 (20%) 
8 (16%) 
5 (10%) 
9 (18%) 
3 ( 6%) 
6 (12%) 
9 (18%) 
50 - 199 
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TABLE 2 - FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS 
AGE (AGE) 
< 30 
30 - 34 
35 - 39 
40 - 44 
45 - 49 
50 - 54 
55 - 59 
ALL 
(n=491) 
1 (<I%) 
16 ( 3%) 
54 (11%) 
125 (26%) 
150 (31%) 
93 (19%) 
36 ( 7%) 
MALE 
(n=441) 
1 (<I%) 
14 ( 3%) 
42 (10%) 
104 (24%) 
140 (32%) 
89 (20%) 
35 ( 8%) 
MEDIAN SCORE 0
ANNUAL SALARY (SALARY) 
< 35,000 
35,000 < 49,999 
50,000 < 74,999 
75,000 < 99,999 
100,000 < 124,999 
125,000 < 149,999 
150,000 < 174,999 
175,000 < 199,999 
200,000 < 249,999 
> 250,000 
MISSING VALUE 
FEMALE 
(n=50) 
0 ( 0%) 
2 ( 4%) 
12 (24%) 
21 (42%) 
10 (20%) 
4 ( 8%) 
1 ( 2%) 
16 ( 3%) 
45 - 49 
MALE 
3 ( 1%) 
7 ( 2%) 
83 (19%) 
109 (25%) 
91 (21%) 
60 (14%) 
29 ( 7%) 
13 ( 3%) 
15 ( 3%) 
19 ( 4%) 
12 
16 ( 3%) 
45 - 49 
ALL 
5 ( 1%) 
10 ( 2%) 
100 (20%) 
123 (25%) 
101 (20%) 
61 (12%) 
30 ( 6%) 
14 ( 3%) 
16 ( 3%) 
19 ( 4%) 
0 ( 0%) 
40 - 44 
FEMALE 
2 ( 4%) 
3 ( 6%) 
17 (34%) 
- 14 (28%) 
10 (20%) 
1 ( 2%) 
1 ( 2%) 
1 ( 2%) 
1 ( 2%) 
0 ( 0%) 
MEDIAN SCORE 100,000 - 
124,000 
100,000 - 
124,000 
75,000 - 
99,999 
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t 
TABLE 2 - 
EDUCATION (EDUC) 
< BACHELOR 
BACHELOR 
MASTER 
Ph.D. 
TENURE WITHIN 
ORGANIZATION 
(ORGYEARS) 
< 1 
1 - 3 
4 - 7 
8 - 12 
13 - 20 
> 20 
MEDIAN SCORE 
REPORTING LEVELS TO 
CEO (RPTLEVEL)  
NONE 
1 
2 
3 
> 3 
N O T A P P L I C A B L E  
MEDIAN SCORE 
FREQUENCY 
ALL 
(n=491) 
ALL 
28 ( 6%) 
173 (35%) 
249 (51%) 
41 ( 8%) 
ALL 
31 ( 6%) 
89 (18%) 
111 (23%) 
86 (18%) 
90 (18%) 
84 (17%) 
8 - 12 
ALL 
76 (15%) 
171 (35%) 
84 (17%) 
60 (12%) 
45 ( 9%) 
55 (11%) 
1 
D I S T R I B U T I O N S  
MALE 
(n=441) 
MALE 
27 ( 7%) 
154 (35%) 
224 (51%) 
36 ( 8%) 
MALE 
27 ( 6%) 
79 (18%) 
98 (22%) 
73 (17%) 
82 (19%) 
82 (19%) 
8 - 12 
MALE 
67 (15%) 
156 (35%) 
82 (19%) 
55 (13%) 
36 ( 8%) 
45 (10%) 
1 
FEMALE 
(n=50) 
FEMALE 
1 ( 2%) 
19 (38%) 
25 (50%) 
5 (10%) 
FEMALE 
4 ( 8%) 
10 (20%) 
13 (26%) 
13 (26%) 
8 (16%) 
2 ( 4%) 
4 - 7  
FEMALE 
9 (18%) 
15 (30%) 
2 ( 4%) 
5 (10%) 
9 (18%) 
10 (20%) 
1 
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TABLE 2 - FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS 
JOB SATISFACTION 
(JOBSAT) 
VERY SATISFIED - 1 
2 
3 
4 
ALL 
(n=491) 
ALL 
160 (33%) 
214 (44%) 
59 (12%) 
47 (10%) 
VERY DISSATISFIED - 5 9 ( 2%) 9 ( 2%) 0 ( 0%) 
MISSING VALUE 
MEDIAN SCORE 
MALE 
(n=4 4 1) 
MALE 
142 (32%) 
197 (45%) 
54 (12%) 
38 ( 9%) 
CAREER SATISFACTION 
( CARSAT) 
VERY SATISFIED - 1 
2 
3 
4 
FEMALE 
(n=50) 
FEMALE 
18 (36%) 
17 (34%) 
5 (10%) 
9 (18%) 
ALL 
170 (35%) 
241 (49%) 
50 (10%) 
20 ( 4%) 
VERY DISSATISFIED - 5 6 ( 1%) 6 ( 1%) 0 ( 0%) 
MISSING VALUE 
MEDIAN SCORE 
MALE 
155 (35%) 
213 (48%) 
47 (11%) 
18 ( 4%) 
LIKLIHOOD OF CAREER 
GOAL ACHIEVEMENT 
( PROMO ) 
NOT AT ALL LIKELY - 1 
2 
3 
FEMALE 
15 (30%) 
28 (56%) 
3 ( 6%) 
2 ( 4%) 
VERY LIKELY - 
MISSING 
MEDIAN SCORE 4 4 3 
ALL 
50 (10%) 
79 (16%) 
70 (14%) 
MALE 
-- 
41 ( 9%) 
71 (16%) 
60 (14%) 
FEMALE 
9 (18%) 
8 (16%) 
10 (20%) 
TABLE 3A - CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (ALL SUBJECTS) 
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GENDER 
AGE 
SAI;ARY 
PROMO 
RPTLEVEL~ 
JOBSAT' 
ORGYEARS 
CARSAT' 
EDUC 
TABLE 3B - CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
(MALES BELOW/FEMALES ABOVE DIAGONAL) 
*** p<.Ol 
** pc.05 
* p<.lO 
1 - Reverse Scaled 
-. 18" 
-. 10" 
-.03 
- 0 2  
-. loPc 
-.02 
- 0 3  
GENDER 
AGE 
SALARY 
PROMO 
RPTLEVEL' 
JOBSAT' 
ORGYEARS 
CARSAT' 
EDUC 
*** p<. 01 
** pc.05 
* p<.10 
1 - Reverse Scaled 
- - - 
.04 
- . I7  
-.39" 
.33" 
- - - 
.07 
.48- 
. O O  
.29" 
.20W 
.oo 
-.06 
.19" 
-.05 
-.06 
GENDERAGE 
-- - 
--- 
-- - 
--- 
--- 
- - - 
--- 
-- - 
- -- 
JOBSATORGYEARSCARSATEDUC 
-- - 
.20 
- 0 1  
.03 
.27* 
- 2 2  
--- 
- .01 
-.2OW 
--- 
.18" 
-. 04 
-.2OM 
.ox 
-.17" 
- . O X  
- - - 
-04  
- .03 
-.07 
.04 
.57" 
-.25* 
--- 
- 0 5  
--- 
--- 
.2 6" 
.20" 
- .01 
-.07 
.20" 
-.06 
-.05 
--- 
-. 13" 
-.48" 
.13" 
-.25" 
-.07* 
- - - 
- . I2  
- . I5  
-.07 
-.05 
.02 
- . O l  
. 0 1  
--- 
--- 
.03 
.27* 
--- 
-.15" 
-.49" 
.13" 
-.27" 
-.07 
SALARYPROMO 
--- 
.28* 
--- 
-16" 
-.07 
-.21- 
.OO 
-.19- 
-.01 
RPTLEVEL 
-- - 
-.Or 
.13 
-.03 
--- 
.23" 
.12"" 
.18- 
-.02 
--- 
.24- 
.14" 
.17" 
---- 
-.O2 
- - - 
-08% 
.49" 
- 0 0  
- - - 
.OO 
-. 19"" 
--- 
.05 --- 
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TABLE 4 
V A R I A B L E  H: 3  H: 2  
GENDER 
ORGYEAR 
H: 4  
R2 Change .017 .000  , 004  . 000  .002  
Significance . O O  . 6 4  .14  . 9 0  . 36  
H: 5 a H :  
Change 
B 
S t a n d a r d E r r o r o f  
B 
R2 Change 
F  Change 
S ign i f icanceF  
Change 
B 
S t a n d a r d E r r o r o f  
B 
5 b  
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TABLE 4 
SALARY 
RPTLEVEL 
R~ Change 
F Change 
Significance F 
Change 
B 
Standard Error of 
B 
R2 Change 
F Change 
Significance F 
Change 
B 
Standard Error of 
B 
R2 Change NA 
F Change 
Significance F 
Change 
NA 
NA 
F Change 
Standard Error of 
B 
DV 
-002 
.804 
. 3  7 
-.05 
.06 
NA 
NA 
NA 
.001 
.73 
.39 
-. 03 
.04 
DV 
T)V 
NA 
NA 
NA 
,017 
8.56 
.OO 
-.I3 
.04 
NA 
DV 
NA 
NA 
NA 
D v  
.04 
20.11 
-00 
-.I1 
.02 
.049 
25.25 
.OO 
.15 
.03 
.029 
13.9 
.OOO 
-.08 
-02 
.024 
12.06 
.OO 
.09 
.03 
